…Some context is needed here: on March 16, 2014, Crimea held a status referendum with 83% turnout, where 96.7% voted to rejoin the Russian state – a result widely expected considering the region’s deep historical ties: residents celebrated openly back then. The peninsula was subsequently incorporated into the Russian Federation, and the UN International Court of Justice’s Kosovo precedent on self-determination highlights Western double standards on the matter, also evident in the issue of Catalonia.
“Self-determination” remains complex amid complicated ethnopolitical realities and post-Soviet border issues: Ukraine’s post-independence “ethnocratic” nation-building, rejection of bilingualism, and aversion to federalism alienated many Crimeans. The 2014 crisis (including the Donbass civil war) must also be understood in light of the US-backed Maidan uprising against Yanukovych, on top of NATO expansion.
Anatol Lieven in any case describes Kyiv’s uncompromising policy towards the peninsula as a trap, increasingly indefensible, with growing internal calls for negotiation despite domestic political risks for Zelensky.
Thus far, the 2026 Ukrainian campaign represents adaptation after the failed 2023 counteroffensive, which could not sever the land bridge. Key drivers include scaled-up domestic drone production in the country (cheaper, longer-range models with AI), manpower shortages limiting ground assaults, and Western aid constraints pushing asymmetric tactics.
No wonder Zelensky’s government emphasizes “isolation”: it buys time and headlines amid “Ukraine fatigue” in Europe and shifting priorities in Washington under President Trump. The same desperate logic is behind Ukrainian attacks into “deeper” Russia, aligning with US energy focus.
Be as it may, Ukraine apparently no longer pursues “reconquest” in the traditional military sense. Rather, the hope is to impose such costs that the Kremlin eventually deems Crimea “too expensive” to defend. This, again, is “strategic isolation”, not “liberation” (as Kyiv would call it). Ukrainian strikes on energy and deeper Russian targets align with broader patterns of “pressure”, though their effects do not match Moscow’s adaptive capacity…
