Cellebrite no sembla que pugui trencar cap xifrat, sinó que ha d’estar desbloquejat, pel que diuen a signal.

UFED creates a backup of your device onto the Windows machine running UFED (it is essentially a frontend to adb backup on Android and iTunes backup on iPhone, with some additional parsing).

o sigui…

One way to think about Cellebrite’s products is that if someone is physically holding your unlocked device in their hands, they could open whatever apps they would like and take screenshots of everything in them to save and go over later. Cellebrite essentially automates that process for someone holding your device in their hands.

A més, sembla que aquest programa té vulnerabilitats pròpies i que en teoria es podria falsejar un informe o manipular el disposotiuemn el que corre…

Looking at both UFED and Physical Analyzer, though, we were surprised to find that very little care seems to have been given to Cellebrite’s own software security. Industry-standard exploit mitigation defenses are missing, and many opportunities for exploitation are present.

Finalment, signal insinua que ha desenvolupat malware per a les cellebrite i que en poca proporció i només per a usuaris reals de signla, no comptes acabatsfde crear, potser el carrega en alguns mòbils. Això fa difícil que arreglin els forats però posa la incertesa enorme sobre la validesa dels informes… obde la seguretat de la màquina :)

In completely unrelated news, upcoming versions of Signal will be periodically fetching files to place in app storage. These files are never used for anything inside Signal and never interact with Signal software or data, but they look nice, and aesthetics are important in software.